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BUDDING CONFLICTS: MARIJUANA’S 
IMPACT ON UNSETTLED QUESTIONS OF 
TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS 
KATHERINE FLOREY* 
Abstract: In the wake of a December 2014 decision by the Department of 
Justice to deprioritize enforcement of federal marijuana laws against tribes as 
well as states, many tribes have reevaluated their policies toward marijuana. 
Tribal attitudes toward marijuana are diverse; some tribes regard marijuana as 
a public health menace, whereas others see it as a source of economic 
opportunity. Where tribal policies are significantly more or less restrictive 
than those of the surrounding state, tribal-state relations have often suffered 
friction.  The problem is particularly acute given the jurisdictional uncertainty 
that characterizes Indian country and the absence of any equivalent to the 
conflict-mediating doctrines that help to smooth interstate relations. As a 
result, federal intervention may be needed to protect tribal sovereignty and 
resolve tribal-state conflict; any such action should be guided by recognizing 
the successes and failures of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
In some ways, we have been here before. In 1987, the U.S Supreme 
Court decided California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, holding that, 
under most circumstances, states lacked authority to enforce state anti-gaming 
laws against tribal operations.1 By the end of the next year, Congress had 
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),2 which somewhat cur-
tailed tribes’ sovereign right to regulate gaming while establishing a frame-
work by which states and tribes could negotiate over the extent of tribal gam-
ing operations. In a short time, tribal casinos became commonplace, and to-
day, tribal gaming is a nearly thirty billion dollar industry.3 
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 1 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 220–22 (1987). 
 2 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2012)). 
 3 See Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, NIGC: 2015 Experienced Largest Tribal Revenue Gain 
in a Decade, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (July 20, 2016) https://indiancountrymedia
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It is going too far to say that tribal-state relations in the gaming arena 
are free of conflict. Indeed, IGRA has been criticized for spawning its own 
litigation industry,4 and many tribes justifiably chafe at the ways in which 
IGRA permits state intrusion into what they see as internal tribal matters 
such as labor law.5 Nonetheless, the story of tribal gaming has, on the 
whole, been one of relative stability. From the state perspective, even states 
with strong anti-gaming traditions have, in many cases, tacitly welcomed 
the presence of tribal gaming operations within state borders, because such 
operations bring benefits to the surrounding communities without necessi-
tating a change in state policy.6 Meanwhile, on the tribal side, tribes have 
often been able to leverage the positive spillover effects of casinos to find 
common ground with states on matters of mutual interest such as treating 
gambling addiction.7 
One might expect tribal marijuana legalization efforts to follow a simi-
lar trajectory. At first glance, there are many parallels between the history of 
tribal gaming and the future of tribal marijuana. Tribes’ ability to engage in 
gaming operations required relief from federal as well as state law.8 Simi-
larly, it is only due to a relaxation in federal policy that tribes have been 
able to explore changes to their marijuana laws.9 Just as with gaming, mari-
juana has the potential to be an economic boon for tribes, whether they 
simply grow marijuana for sale to off-reservation commercial sellers or 
medical dispensaries or use marijuana to attract tourism—as the South Da-
kota Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe hoped to do through their efforts to 
launch a “marijuana resort” in 2015.10 
                                                                                                                           
network.com/travel/nigc-2015-experienced-largest-tribal-revenue-gain-in-a-decade/ [https://perma.
cc/AY2G-BUK5]. 
 4 See, e.g., Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and 
State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 1007 
(2007) (explaining that the “IGRA's lack of direction on the appropriate and legitimate role of 
state government in negotiating and enacting compacts has led to litigation”).  
 5 See Kevin Gover & Tom Gede, The States as Trespassers in a Federal-Tribal Relationship: 
A Historical Critique of Tribal-State Compacting Under IGRA, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 185, 207–08 
(2010). 
 6 See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J. 285, 
294 (2003-2004) (discussing phenomenon of states with anti-gaming policies tolerating “islands” 
of tribal gaming). 
 7 See W. Ron Allen, IGRA Intended Better State/Tribal Relations, INDIAN GAMING, July 
2007, at 14, 14 (discussing productive collaboration between Washington tribes and Washington 
State). 
 8 The Johnson Act made use of some gaming devices in Indian country a federal crime prior 
to the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (2012).  
 9 See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 10 Sarah Sunshine Manning, Santee Sioux Assert Tribal Sovereignty, Open First Marijuana 
Resort, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 6, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
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Yet, there are also significant differences that suggest that marijuana 
may force tribes and states to grapple with difficult issues of spillovers and 
extraterritorial regulation in a way that gaming did not. To begin with, a 
casino is, of course, inherently stationary. A tribal gaming enterprise can 
deliver to the surrounding state community both economic benefits and 
problems such as increased traffic, but its effects are limited by the certainty 
that the gaming itself will happen on-reservation. By contrast, marijuana is 
easily transported across reservation borders, increasing effects across bor-
ders as well.11 
Second, splits in opinion about marijuana appear deeper than was true 
of tribal gaming. Tribes were pioneers in widespread legalization of gam-
ing. By contrast, states led the liberalization of marijuana policy,12 yet liber-
alization still provokes a sharp divide among them.13 Tribal views on mari-
juana are likewise divided, sometimes even among tribes who occupy terri-
tory within a single state.14 
The federal role is different as well. Federal involvement in tribal gam-
ing was extensive and followed a mostly consistent course.15 By contrast, 
federal attitudes toward marijuana in general and tribal marijuana in par-
ticular have been both hands-off and ever-shifting, with the Department of 
Justice—possibly in response to state pressures—sending sharply mixed 
signals about the acceptability of tribal marijuana ventures.16 
These differences suggest that different marijuana policies will pose is-
sues for state-tribal relations in a way that gaming has not. In doing so, the 
marijuana regulation question is likely to reveal the inadequacies of current 
legal doctrine for addressing the horizontal dimension of state-tribal rela-
                                                                                                                           
2015/10/06/santee-sioux-assert-tribal-sovereignty-open-first-marijuana-resort-161976 [https://perma.
cc/EG5Y-NDNY] [hereinafter Manning, Sovereignty].  
 11 See Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking the 
Supreme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-Legalization 
Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829, 1837–38 (2015) (noting that a greater spillover problem exists 
for “goods” such as marijuana, as opposed to “actions” such as “gambling, prostitution, and prize-
fighting” (citations omitted)). 
 12 See Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop 
Laws to Protect Themselves From Marijuana Spillover From Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 B.C. 
L. REV 1, 2–4 (companion symposium piece forthcoming May 2017) (discussing the spread of 
marijuana legalization efforts following California’s 1996 legalization of medical marijuana). 
 13 See id. at 5 (“Even while many states (and some tribes) have rushed to legalize marijuana 
. . . other states and the federal government remain chronically opposed to marijuana 
legalization.”). 
 14 See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216–17 (discussing federal involvement in “promoting tribal 
bingo enterprises” as part of the overall federal policy of “encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and 
economic development”). 
 16 See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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tions. In the strange world of Indian country jurisdiction, both tribal and 
state powers are uncertain, potentially conflicting, and predicated largely on 
tribal membership (or lack of it) rather than tribal territorial borders.17 
Structural constitutional provisions that might bring order to this landscape, 
such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses in Article IV of the Constitution and in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,18 simply do not apply to tribes. As a result, many inevitable questions 
that will arise when tribal and state marijuana policies diverge have no clear 
answers. 
This Article considers this problem. It begins with a survey of current 
tribal marijuana policies and initiatives and continues with a discussion of 
the background jurisdictional principles that make the cross-border effects 
of tribes on states (and vice versa) such a tangled area to navigate.19 Part I 
discusses recent developments in federal policy in this realm and illustrates 
that, even with apparent federal go-ahead, tribes still face the possibility of 
state pushback.20 Part II examines this pushback and the legal uncertainty 
that often serves to heighten state-tribal tensions.21 Part III concludes with a 
cautious recommendation of a federal framework built on what has been 
described as “cooperative tri-federalism” to bring clarity to this sure-to-be-
contested area.22 
I. THE PAST AND FUTURE OF TRIBAL MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 
On December 11, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a guid-
ance letter to U.S. Attorneys and tribal liaisons suggesting that the same 
policies governing enforcement of federal marijuana laws applicable to 
states would also be extended to tribes.23 Under these principles, the letter 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 87–114 and accompanying text.  
 18 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” 
or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ 
Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 731–32 (2007) (discussing role of these 
provisions in the interstate context); Kelly Stoner & Richard A. Orona, Full Faith and Credit, 
Comity, or Federal Mandate? A Path That Leads to Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court 
Orders, Tribal Protection Orders, and Tribal Child Custody Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 381, 384–
85 (2004) (questioning whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to Indian tribes).  
 19 See infra notes 23–115 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 23–49 and accompanying text.  
 21 See infra notes 50–115 and accompanying text. 
 22 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 
259, 282 (2010); see infra notes 117–132 and accompanying text.  
 23 Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir. of the Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to All United States Attorneys et al. (Oct. 28, 2014). The memorandum, while 
released in December, was dated October 28, 2014. See Lael Echo-Hawk, Garvey Schubert Barer 
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proclaimed that the “limited [federal] investigative and prosecutorial re-
sources” would be focused on eight narrow areas, such as preventing mari-
juana sales to minors and drugged driving.24 The letter specifically noted 
that “in the event that sovereign Indian Nations seek to legalize the cultiva-
tion or use of marijuana in Indian Country,” the eight priorities would con-
tinue to “guide” federal authorities.25 The policy articulated in the letter had 
been developed internally without tribal consultation;26 nonetheless, the 
letter was widely seen by tribes and others as opening the door to tribal le-
galization.27 
Following the issuance of this guidance, some tribes began to test the 
waters. In one well-publicized initiative, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe 
in South Dakota planned to open the nation’s first marijuana resort, includ-
ing a grow facility, a lounge in which guests could use the tribally-grown 
product, and a shuttle service so that guests could avoid driving under the 
influence.28 In preparation for this venture, the Flandreau Santee Sioux 
Tribal Executive Committee legalized marijuana on June 11, 2015.29 Alt-
hough tribal council members saw the venture as potentially profitable, they 
also supported it as an assertion of tribal power and autonomy. A tribal 
council member explained the tribe’s goals for the project by stating, “We 
have sovereignty and we have to assert it.”30 The tribe’s assertion of sover-
eignty was particularly significant because the Flandreau Santee Sioux 
Tribe reservation is located within the boundaries of South Dakota, a state 
where marijuana remains illegal.31 
Other tribes began more quietly to explore the possibilities that mari-
juana might offer. The Pinoleville Pomo Nation in California began con-
struction of a ten million dollar greenhouse for a planned medical marijuana 
enterprise, and other California tribes also began to explore medical mariju-
                                                                                                                           
Law, Presentation at California Indian Law Association 15th Annual Indian Law Conference & 
Gala: Cannabis in Indian Country 3 (Oct. 16, 2015). 
 24 Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 2. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Echo-Hawk, supra note 23, at 3. 
 27 See, e.g., Steven Nelson, Tribes Can Legalize Pot, Justice Department Decides, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/12/11/tribes-can-
legalize-pot-justice-department-decides [https://perma.cc/U67J-RC92].  
 28 Manning, Sovereignty, supra note 10. 
 29 See FLANDREAU SANTEE SIOUX TRIBE, TRIBAL CODE tit. 29 (2015); Flandreau Santee 
Sioux Tribe Res. No. 15-56 (2015) (approving and making effective the Marijuana Control 
Ordinance).  
 30 Manning, Sovereignty, supra note 10 (quoting Kenny Weston). 
 31 Id. 
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ana operations.32 Inquiries poured into FoxBarry Companies, a tribal busi-
ness development group, whose president claimed to have been contacted 
by more than one hundred tribes seeking advice on potential marijuana ini-
tiatives.33 
Unforeseen conflicts with state and federal authorities, however, soon 
put a damper on such plans. By mid-2015, for example, the Flandreau San-
tee Sioux Tribe’s marijuana resort had advanced closer to reality.34 The tribe 
had built the grow facility, planted crops, and begun to convert an existing 
building into the planned lounge.35 The Tribe’s plans encountered a hitch, 
however, when South Dakota’s Attorney General threatened prosecution of 
nonmembers of the Tribe who ingested marijuana on the reservation or left 
Indian country under the influence of marijuana.36 Despite the Tribe’s will-
ingness to work with nontribal authorities on such jurisdictional issues, fed-
eral authorities discouraged it from proceeding with the project, warning of 
an imminent raid if the Tribe persisted.37 In response, the Tribe made the 
difficult decision to burn marijuana crops and suspend the project.38 
Elsewhere, tribes faced similar obstacles. In September 2015, federal 
and local officials raided the marijuana operations of Pinoleville Pomo Na-
tion’s Rancheria and the Pit River and Alturas Tribes, all located in northern 
California.39 These actions worried tribe members who had seen the Justice 
Department’s guidance letter as a green light for tribes to develop their own 
marijuana policies.40 Instead, tribes began to realize that, in the words of 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Alysa Landry, Proceed with Caution: A Warning to Tribes Wanting to Grow Medical Mariju-
ana, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 16, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.
com/2015/02/16/proceed-caution-warning-tribes-wanting-grow-medical-marijuana-159208 [https://
perma.cc/G5PL-37PE]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Sarah Sunshine Manning, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe Burns Crop, Suspends 
Marijuana Operation, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Nov. 8, 2015), http://indiancountry
todaymedianetwork.com/2015/11/08/flandreau-santee-sioux-tribe-burns-crop-suspends-marijuana-
operation-162363 [https://perma.cc/9TVH-VDXF] [hereinafter Manning, Suspends]. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See After Federal Raids, U.S. Tribes Cautioned About Marijuana, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015, 
7:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-federal-raids-u-s-tribes-cautioned-about-marijuana/ 
[https://perma.cc/S9G5-3X9H] [hereinafter Raids]; Glenda Anderson, Raid on Northern California 
Tribal Marijuana Farms Underscores Uncertainty Over Pot Laws, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/4521945-181/raid-on-tribal-marijuana-farms [https://
perma.cc/JD6C-M47S]. 
 40 See Raids, supra note 39. 
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one tribal business development director, “The tribes are not going to be 
immune to what the local attitudes toward marijuana are going to be.”41 
In light of this comment, it is notable that state concerns have often 
appeared to drive federal involvement to restrict tribal operations. South 
Dakota’s staunch opposition to the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe’s marijua-
na resort appears to have played a central role in unnerving federal authori-
ties and ultimately halting the Tribe’s plans.42 Similarly, although medical 
marijuana was legal in California at the time the federal raids on tribal crops 
occurred, aspects of the tribal operations, such as their alleged for-profit 
purpose, may have been in tension with state law, prompting concern from 
state, federal, and local officials.43 
By contrast, tribes whose legalization policies are more clearly in har-
mony with those of the surrounding state have had significantly more suc-
cess in their marijuana ventures. After Washington State decriminalized rec-
reational marijuana use, some tribes located within the state decided to fol-
low suit. The Squaxin and Suquamish Tribes, for example, both legalized 
marijuana and made deals with the State to sell it on tribal lands.44 Notably, 
the Suquamish Tribe’s action was a direct result of the change in state poli-
cy, which tribal leaders saw as bringing unstoppable change to the region. 
As the Suquamish chairman noted, “The state legalized this,” and despite 
some tribe members’ qualms about legalization, “the fact is, it’s here.”45 
Indeed, it is the tribes wishing to maintain anti-marijuana policies that 
have had the most difficulty with Washington State’s change in policy. The 
Port Gamble S’Klallam Reservation, for example, has declined to legalize 
marijuana, citing potential public health issues.46 The Yakama Nation, in an 
extension of its longtime clashes with Washington State over its alcohol 
ban, has taken a particularly strong stance against marijuana, attempting not 
only to prohibit its use on the reservation, but also to extend the proscription 
to off-reservation lands where the tribe possesses hunting and fishing 
rights.47 In such off-reservation lands, which extend over ten counties, the 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. (quoting Blake Trueblood). 
 42 See Manning, Suspends, supra note 34 (describing South Dakota’s role). 
 43 See Anderson, supra note 39. 
 44 Richard Walker, Let It Be Pot: Two Washington State Tribes on Board, INDIAN COUNTRY 
MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 2, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/12/02/let-it-
be-pot-two-washington-state-tribes-board-162613 [https://perma.cc/V5FW-F4W9].  
 45 Id. (quoting Suquamish Chairman Leonard Forsman). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Jonathan Kaminsky, Indian Tribe Seeks Pot Business Ban in Part of Washington State, 
REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-tribe-idUSBREA2N1
2J20140324 [https://perma.cc/C89K-EADB] (discussing Yakama Nation’s stance against marijuana 
legalization). 
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Tribe has sought to deny marijuana business applications; whether the Tribe 
has the authority to do so is contested and may ultimately be decided in 
court.48 
Thus far, the tribal experience appears to illustrate that a focus on federal 
policy alone is incomplete. Even with an apparent federal go-ahead, tribes 
will face states that are uncomfortable with more liberal tribal marijuana poli-
cies than prevail statewide or, on the flip side, states that are unwilling or un-
able to assist tribes in enforcing more restrictive policies. Part II examines the 
legal uncertainty that often serves to heighten such state-tribal tensions.49 
II. MARIJUANA AND REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 
The tribal experience with marijuana raises at least two important 
questions. First, does the sovereign authority of tribes include the right to 
pursue marijuana policies in conflict with state law? As Section A discusses, 
a complicated and often uncertain jurisdictional landscape underlies that 
question.50 Second, to the extent states’ and tribes’ marijuana policies di-
verge, what mechanisms do both sorts of sovereigns have to combat extra-
territorial spillovers?51 This question is not merely unsettled but woefully 
underexplored. Section B attempts to provide an overview of these issues.  
A. The Hazy Boundaries of State and Tribal Law 
The first problem of negotiating conflicts between tribal and state au-
thority is that the boundaries of both are poorly delineated. One might ex-
pect that tribal powers would be defined, at least in the first instance, by 
reservation borders that would not remove the issue of spillovers but would 
at least clarify what is legal on tribal lands. Nevertheless, since the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided the 1978 case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
which held that tribes lacked criminal authority over non-Indians,52 a series 
of decisions has both weakened tribal sovereignty and conditioned that sov-
ereignty, to a great extent, on the status of the parties as “Indians” and/or 
tribe members.53 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. 
 49 See infra notes 50–114 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 52–85 and accompanying text.  
 51 See infra notes 87–114 and accompanying text. 
 52 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). 
 53 For purposes of determining the scope of criminal jurisdiction, someone is defined as 
“Indian” if that person has some Indian blood and a “sufficient connection” to a federally 
recognized tribe. See LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304–05 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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In the criminal arena, the rules are fairly clear, if byzantine. Tribes may 
exercise limited criminal jurisdiction over Indians54 in Indian country.55 
States, aside from a handful permitted to assume criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country under Public Law 280, lack authority over Indian country 
crimes involving Indians,56 but can prosecute cases involving only non-
Indians regardless of whether they take place on or off tribal lands.57 The 
question whether states possess jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit 
victimless crimes—which might include some marijuana-related infrac-
tions—is unsettled, although some states have asserted jurisdiction over 
such crimes.58 The federal government fills in some of the gaps left by this 
scheme,59 while also possessing concurrent authority with tribes in some 
cases.60 
An additional twist relevant to the marijuana context, however, is that 
several states, including some such as California and Washington where 
tribes have sought to adopt marijuana policies potentially at odds with state 
law, have extended their criminal jurisdiction through Public Law 280 
(“P.L. 280”).61  P.L. 280 is a 1953 law that granted some states criminal 
powers in Indian country while establishing a process for other states to opt 
in and assume jurisdiction.62 Although P.L. 280 gives affected states full 
                                                                                                                           
 54 In the Supreme Court’s decision in Duro v. Reina in 1990, the Court held that tribes could 
not prosecute nonmember Indians, but Congress later restored this authority through the “Duro 
fix.” 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990); see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004). In addition, 
the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 gives a handful of tribes narrow 
powers to prosecute spousal and dating violence perpetrated by non-Indians. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 
(2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 55 Indian country is defined as “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government,” as well as “all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States” and “all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 
not been extinguished.” 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 56 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.03[1], at 763 (Nell Jessup Newton 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. This includes crimes in which, of the perpetrator 
and victim, one is an Indian and one is not. Id.  
 57 See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 56, § 9.03[1), at 763.  
 58 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 56, § 9.03[1], at 763. 
 59 See id. § 9.02, at 738–62. 
 60 See id. § 9.04, at 765–69. 
 61 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1162 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)). California is one of the six jurisdictions that were 
originally vested with criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country under P.L. 280. 18 U.S.C. § 1162. 
Washington was not one of the original jurisdictions but opted in. See WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 37.12.010 (2016) (assuming jurisdiction under P.L. 280 despite not being one of the six original 
jurisdictions). 
 62 Act of Aug. 15, 1953. South Dakota, another site of state-tribal marijuana clashes in the 
case of the Flandreau Santee Sioux, has assumed only limited jurisdiction on highways passing 
through reservations. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-1-17 to -21 (2017). 
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authority to enforce criminal “prohibitory” laws against both Indians and 
non-Indians on tribal territory, the Supreme Court has held that it confers no 
special rights on states to enforce laws that are merely “regulatory.”63 Under 
this distinction, first articulated in 1987 by the United States Supreme Court 
in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, California’s laws prohib-
iting high-stakes bingo fell on the “regulatory” side of the divide because 
California permitted many other forms of gambling.64 That high-stakes bin-
go was a misdemeanor subject to criminal enforcement in California did not 
change the Court’s conclusion.65 
The Court itself admitted the difficulty of drawing the regulatory ver-
sus prohibitory distinction in Cabazon, noting that is was “not a bright-line 
rule” and “an argument of some weight may be made that the bingo statute 
is prohibitory rather than regulatory.”66 In the gaming context, Congress 
eliminated some of the uncertainty that might otherwise have persisted 
about the classification of other P.L. 280 states’ gaming laws by passing the 
IGRA, which narrowed tribal powers by making the scope of permissible 
tribal gaming largely contingent on state law.67 In the marijuana context, 
however, courts will likely have to confront this thorny issue anew. Whether 
a state prohibition is “criminal” under P.L. 280 tends to depend on the scope 
of the activity banned. Thus, P.L. 280 states that forbid sale, possession, or 
use of all forms of marijuana are likely to be able to extend such laws to 
Indian country. By contrast, states that legalize marijuana to some degree, 
but with restrictions, may have more difficulty characterizing their laws as 
“criminal prohibitory.” 
The civil context is even more complicated. First, a few broad princi-
ples: Tribes are subject to federal laws deemed to be “of general applicabil-
ity,” which, under the approaches of most circuits, has proved to be the vast 
majority.68 Tribes may regulate the conduct of their own members in Indian 
                                                                                                                           
 63 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209–10 (1987). 
 64 Id. at 209–11. 
 65 Id. at 211. 
 66 Id. at 210. 
 67 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–1168 (2012) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2012)); see Rebecca Tsosie, 
Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 50–52 (1997) (discussing role of state law in 
the IGRA process). 
 68 See Alex T. Skibine, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal 
Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 22 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 123, 125–26, 132 
(2016) (explaining that most circuits have adopted an approach to this question under which they 
presume that federal regulatory law applies to tribes). 
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country and (perhaps, in limited circumstances) outside of it as well.69 
Tribes’ civil authority over nonmembers, by contrast, is strictly limited un-
der the so-called Montana framework, which applies both to tribal regula-
tion and the jurisdiction of tribal courts.70 From here on out, the landscape 
becomes more uncertain. 
In theory, the overarching framework that the United States Supreme 
Court established in 1981 in Montana v. United States prohibits the asser-
tion of tribal civil authority over nonmembers unless one of two exceptions 
is met: the nonmember has either entered into a “consensual relationship[]” 
with the tribe or is engaging in conduct that poses a severe threat to tribal 
health or welfare.71 In practice, many questions remain. To begin with, 
Montana itself involved solely nonmember activities on private land, and 
the Court has at times suggested that tribal power on tribal land may be 
greater.72 In 2011, in Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. 
LaRance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals built on these suggestions, 
holding that the Montana framework did not limit tribal power over non-
members acting on tribal land.73 Because many tribal enterprises are located 
on tribal trust land, this narrow reading of Montana gives tribes in the Ninth 
Circuit a great deal more power to regulate nonmember activity. 
Additional controversy exists about how narrowly or broadly the Mon-
tana exceptions should be read. Most recently, in 2014, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indi-
ans held that the “consensual relationship” exception permitted a tribe to 
exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that had signed a lease whose provi-
sions could be enforced in tribal court-even though the suit at hand involved 
not a lease dispute but the sexual molestation of a tribe member.74 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and was widely expected to narrowly re-
verse;75 instead, following Justice Scalia’s death, the Court split 4-4 in a 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 7.02[1][c], at 603 (suggesting that tribes have 
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 70 See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (holding that the framework 
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 71 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
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control over nonmember conduct on tribal land”); Montana, 450 U.S. at 547. 
 73 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810–12 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 74 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of 
Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). 
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brief per curiam opinion, affirming the Fifth Circuit result for the moment 
but leaving the underlying issue still uncertain.76 
The limits of state civil authority in Indian country are also unclear. In 
the foundational 1832 case of Worcester v. Georgia, the United States Su-
preme Court described Indian country as a place where state law “can have 
no force,” but that view has since been eroded to some degree.77 Today, in 
assessing the limits of state power in Indian country, courts apply an ill-
defined balancing test that incorporates principles of federal preemption, trib-
al sovereignty, and state interests.78 Under this scheme, for example, in 1980, 
in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that Washington State had the authority both to 
tax nontribal purchasers of cigarettes sold by a tribe in Indian country and to 
require the tribe to take measures to enforce the tax, including maintaining 
“detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transactions.”79 
In other cases, however, the Court has found that states lack regulatory 
authority in Indian country. For example, in Cabazon, the Court held that 
California’s efforts to enforce its bingo restrictions against a tribal enter-
prise to be not only unauthorized by P.L. 280, but also impermissible as an 
exercise of California’s inherent powers in Indian country.80 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court cited both the federal policy of support for tribal gam-
ing enterprises and the Tribe’s “comfortable, clean, and attractive facilities 
and well-run games,” the latter of which led the Court to reject the state’s 
view that the tribe was “merely marketing an exemption from state gam-
bling laws.”81 
As such examples suggest, the Court’s application of the balancing test 
is thus highly context-specific, often hinging on the degree to which the 
tribe has added value to the product or service being sold.82 Indeed, some 
have argued that the varying results have as much to do with the degree to 
                                                                                                                           
tribal-courts-in-civil-suits.html [https://perma.cc/J3JW-WSAX] (suggesting that, following oral 
argument, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . seemed poised to limit the power of Indian tribal courts to 
hear civil cases against outsiders”). 
 76 See Dollar Gen. Corp., 136 S. Ct. at 2160 
 77 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832). 
 78 See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333–34 (1983) (explaining that 
“[s]tate jurisdiction is preempted . . . if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal 
interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the 
assertion of State authority”). 
 79 447 U.S. 134, 159–60 (1980). 
 80 480 U.S. at 212, 221–22 (1987). 
 81 Id. at 217–19. 
 82 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155 (noting that “[i]t is painfully apparent that the value marketed 
by the smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by 
activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest”). 
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which the Court approves the underlying activity (smoking on the one hand, 
“clean . . . and attractive” gaming facilities on the other) than with objective 
differences such as the degree of federal support or the impact of tribal ac-
tivities on surrounding state areas.83 
The hallmark, then, of the doctrines regulating state and tribal authori-
ty in Indian country is their unpredictability and lack of susceptibility to 
anything but case-by-case analysis. The possibility of varying state and trib-
al marijuana regulation promises to test these murky boundaries as perhaps 
never before. Are California’s regulations on medical marijuana production 
regulatory or prohibitory? To what extent can states require tribes to enforce 
state marijuana law against nonmembers who travel to Indian country to 
partake? Is it permissible for a tribe in South Dakota to grow marijuana for 
on-site use and sell it only to tribe members and residents of states where 
marijuana is legal? Does an upscale, well-run marijuana resort resemble 
more closely the gaming facility in Cabazon, allowed to operate without 
interference from state law,84 or the cigarette enterprise in Colville, deemed 
by the Court to be merely “market[ing] an exemption” and thus subject to 
state tax?85 These questions do not at the moment have clear answers, and 
this uncertainty complicates the problem of coexistence between state and 
tribal policies. Section B considers the spillover problems that may arise 
when state and tribal marijuana laws diverge.86 
B. The Rarely Considered Issue of Tribal-State Spillovers 
The doctrines regarding extraterritorial assertion of state power are 
famously unclear.87 Even so, however, mechanisms that include both consti-
tutional requirements and informal norms serve to make severe interstate 
friction on these issues relatively rare.88 The Supreme Court has read the 
dormant Commerce Clause to encompass some restriction on clearly extra-
                                                                                                                           
 83 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 219; see, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: 
The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1600–08, 
1619–20 (1996) (describing justices’ subjective opinions as driving the results in both Colville and 
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 84 See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 219. 
 85 Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. 
 86 See infra notes 87–115 and accompanying text. 
 87 See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 
1060 (2009) (noting that the scope of extraterritorial limits on state power is “notoriously 
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 88 See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 
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territorial state legislation;89 likewise, state courts may apply their state’s 
law to out-of-state events only if the case has some connection to the state.90 
Both prohibitions are fairly lenient and to some extent contested, but they 
act at a minimum as a backstop to states’ overt attempts to interfere in each 
other’s affairs. 
As the Constitution limits state overreaching, it also contains mecha-
nisms that foster day-to-day interstate harmony. The most important of 
these is likely the requirement of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that states 
enforce sister-state judgments automatically.91 This provision allows the 
relatively seamless transfer of judicial authority from one jurisdiction to 
another, and prevents the friction that might ensue—as it often does in the 
international context—were states allowed to second-guess each other’s 
policy choices and judicial procedures.92 
More informal norms and doctrines also help to smooth interstate rela-
tions. The choice-of-law doctrines state courts use to select decisional law 
in cases with multistate contacts often take into account the interests of oth-
er states. California’s “comparative impairment” principle, for example, 
directs courts confronting otherwise insoluble conflicts to apply the law of 
the state whose interest “would be more impaired if its policy were subordi-
nated to the policy of the other state.”93 The choice-of-law process brings 
states together in another way; by familiarizing judges with the law of other 
states, particularly neighboring ones, it may help to smooth out interstate 
differences and permit states to easily borrow successful policy innova-
tions.94 At the legislative level, states exert mutual influence on each other 
as well; for example, states sometimes react to regional problems with 
cross-border effects (such as impaired driving) by harmonizing their laws 
with those of their neighbors.95 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See generally Katherine Florey, Making It Work: Tribal Innovation, State Reaction, and the 
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 90 See id. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. 
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 94 Shane A. Gleason & Robert M. Howard, State Supreme Courts and Shared Networking: 
The Diffusion of Education Policy, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1485, 1511 (2014–15). 
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Finally, when relations break down, states have conflict resolution 
mechanisms available. States may invoke the Supreme Court’s original ju-
risdiction, as Nebraska and Oklahoma attempted to do (albeit unsuccessful-
ly) to enjoin Colorado’s efforts to legalize recreational marijuana.96 As 
Heather Gerken and Ari Holzblatt have argued in a co-authored article, nu-
merous less formal options exist as well. Turning to Congress, which can 
help negotiate compromises and deals, is “a natural choice for those ag-
grieved by an interstate spillover and seeking a referee.”97 Political parties 
can help build trust and coalitions across state lines.98 Interstate compacts 
and uniform laws likewise help in mediating differences.99 Together, these 
mechanisms add up to frequently “robust, cooperative networks among fed-
eral, state, and local officials that can and do safeguard horizontal federal-
ism.”100 
The point of this discussion is not that these mechanisms work perfect-
ly. Indeed, the issues described in other contributions to this Symposium 
offer ample evidence that they do not.101 But as patchy and imperfect as the 
doctrines promoting interstate harmony may be, they likely play at least 
some role in forestalling interstate conflict. By contrast, for two important 
and related reasons—the absence of equivalent mechanisms and the poor 
history of tribal-state relations—open conflict between tribes and states 
seems far more likely. 
To start with the first problem, the Constitution simply does not regu-
late the relationships between tribes and states. There is no Full Faith and 
Credit Clause applicable to tribes; a number of states have extended full 
faith and credit or other forms of comity to tribal judgments, but the majori-
ty of states still have not.102 Tribes are not subject to any constitutional lim-
its in the decisional law they apply to multijurisdictional disputes, a fact that 
appears to have influenced some Supreme Court justices in the direction of 
limiting tribal sovereignty.103 Presumably, the converse of this principle is 
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true as well—in other words, the Constitution does not require states to ap-
ply tribal law to disputes with tribal contacts.104 The informal borrowing 
and mutual influence that occurs among states also rarely occurs between 
states and tribes, and when it does, it is one-sided; tribes sometimes borrow 
from state law to fill in gaps in tribal codes, but tribal law seldom exerts an 
influence on state legislatures or courts, which may (wrongly in many cas-
es) regard it as too difficult to ascertain or apply.105 All this means that tribal 
and state authorities are relatively unacquainted with each other, and are 
unlikely to have had the routine encounters with each other’s law that build 
familiarity and trust. 
This problem is compounded by the historical (and often justified) 
skepticism that tribes tend to feel about state interference in tribal affairs. 
Throughout U.S. history, states have frequently attempted to encroach on 
tribal sovereignty by applying their law to tribal territory, setting the stage 
for many important legal battles from Worcester, which held that Georgia 
law had no force in Cherokee territory,106 to the more recent Williams v. 
Lee, in which the Court held that the principle that tribes should be able to 
“make their own laws and be ruled by them” required trying a claim against 
tribe members in Navajo rather than Arizona court.107 
Even when tribes and states have not been in active conflict, they have 
tended to inhabit separate spheres. From the 1830 United States Supreme 
Court decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the United States has been 
understood to have a trust relationship with tribes.108 Though the federal 
government has certainly been a perfidious guardian through many phases 
of U.S. history, in recent years it has for the most part pursued a bipartisan 
policy of fostering tribal sovereignty and autonomy.109 The United States 
defends tribal interests in court,110 aids tribal economic development,111 and 
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permits tribes to develop their own environmental regulations that may dif-
fer from those of the surrounding state.112 
Even today, of course, the federal government may meddle in tribal 
self-governance or fail to defend tribal interests with sufficient vigor. For 
better or worse, however, the United States is the focal point of tribes’ gov-
ernment-to-government interactions. Tribes are used to negotiating with the 
federal government and have some assurance that it will safeguard their 
interests. By contrast, tribal-state relations are fraught with suspicion, legal 
uncertainty, and simple lack of historical experience. Where tribes and 
states have been compelled to negotiate with each other, as, for example, 
the IGRA demands, the results have often been unsatisfactory.113 
None of this is to suggest that tribal-state relations are uniformly bleak 
or that there have not been significant successes. Some states and some 
tribes have productively cooperated even when the issues at stake are con-
tentious ones. A tribal chairman, for example, highlights the “co-regulatory 
environment” and “respectful government-to-government relationship” that 
his tribe has achieved with Washington State in negotiating gaming com-
pacts.114 Such instances do not change the reality, however, that few legal 
structures are in place to foster or cement such relationships. 
The absence of such mechanisms for smoothing state-tribal relation-
ships is likely to be felt particularly acutely as tribes and states explore new 
policies toward marijuana. Regulation of marijuana raises economic, moral, 
medical, public health, and safety considerations; as seen by the experience 
of Washington State tribes, tribes may adopt views on these subject that dif-
fer both from those held in the surrounding state and from each other. Even 
when tribes adopt policies that are broadly similar to those of the surround-
ing state, details of implementation may vary in ways that invite conflict. 
The next section argues that, although individual states and tribes may be 
able to negotiate resolutions to these issues, ultimately federal involvement 
(whether in the form of guidance or legislation) may be necessary both to 
protect tribal sovereignty and to foster tribal-state harmony.115 
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III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S POTENTIAL ROLE 
Part III suggests that the federal government should play a role in me-
diating potential state-tribal conflicts over marijuana.116 Before elaborating 
on this argument, it is important to note that this argument rests on norms of 
federal-tribal relations that, though longstanding, may quickly become ob-
solete under the new administration. Even if a Trump Administration con-
tinues to deprioritize enforcement of federal marijuana laws against states 
and tribes—an outcome that increasingly seems in doubt117—there is no 
guarantee that the administration will preserve the pro-tribal sovereignty 
policies that have been in place since the Nixon Administration. A forth-
coming article argues that, in the area of tribal self-governance, Donald 
Trump “has a dark history in this arena, propagating lies and racial accusa-
tions to promote his casino interests.”118 Such attitudes could upend the 
longtime support for tribal autonomy that this section assumes the federal 
government would and should exercise. 
If some degree of consistency with past practices is assumed, however, 
the federal government has two important roles to play. The first is to en-
sure that tribes, like states, have the ability to reach independent sovereign 
judgments about the degree to which marijuana should be legal. The second 
is to provide a structure—whether through legislation or more informal 
mechanisms—by which states and tribes can resolve conflicts about the 
spillover effects of their marijuana laws. 
To consider the first issue, it goes without saying that the hundreds of 
tribes located within the United States, of which there are 566 federally reg-
istered tribes alone,119 will vary in their stances toward marijuana growing, 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See infra notes 119–132 and accompanying text. 
 117 President Trump’s Attorney General, Senator Jeff Sessions, for example, has stated that 
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sales, or use. In Washington State alone, for example, the Suquamish police 
chief has seen marijuana legalization as a route to bringing higher environ-
mental standards to a formerly clandestine industry.120 By contrast, the di-
rector of the Port Gamble S’Klallam tribe has described marijuana as a pub-
lic health threat,121 and the leadership of the Yakama Nation—in keeping 
with the tribe’s longstanding anti-alcohol stance—has viewed marijuana use 
as directly contrary to tribal values.122 As with states’ differing views on 
marijuana, these distinct tribal positions, informed by history, culture, eco-
nomics, and recent experience, are entitled to protection. 
It is not just tribes, however, but governments more generally that may 
benefit from allowing tribes autonomy to regulate marijuana as they see fit. 
Because of their demographic and cultural variety and their often smaller 
and more responsive governments, tribes offer particular potential as 
Brandeisian laboratories of democracy.123 In a nation still experimenting 
with a variety of marijuana policies, tribes offer the opportunity to test re-
sults on a smaller scale and in an environment where unsuccessful policies 
may in some cases be more easily reversed. 
Tribal autonomy, therefore, is an important value, and one that the fed-
eral government can protect in the first instance by ensuring that the Justice 
Department’s enforcement policy toward tribal marijuana legalization is 
both clear and as consistent as possible with the policy applied to states. 
Although the 2014 guidance letter seemed superficially to put tribes and 
states on an equal footing with respect to marijuana enforcement, it is not 
clear that it reflected a complete reckoning with the potential conflicts that 
might result were states and tribes to pursue different policies. In addition, 
the federal authorities’ subsequent raids and threatened raids have called 
into question whether the guidance letter continues to represent the federal 
view.124 Consultation with tribes would enhance the Justice Department’s 
decision-making process in future, which would both show respect for tribal 
sovereignty and potentially head off sources of tribal-state friction. Willing-
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ness to enter into memoranda of understanding with individual tribes con-
sidering marijuana legalization, as one lawyer working in the area has sug-
gested,125 would also remove some of the legal uncertainty that has plagued 
efforts such as the marijuana resort. Finally, efforts to establish clarity in the 
law and protect tribal interests should not be confined to pro-marijuana 
tribes; tribes that wish to maintain marijuana policies more restrictive than 
those of the surrounding state should be able to seek federal enforcement 
aid where appropriate. 
Perhaps the more difficult problem is that of resolving frictions be-
tween tribes and states that choose to pursue different policies. In this re-
gard, it is worth noting that the potential for state/tribal clashes over mariju-
ana is not necessarily materially different than the possibility of similar con-
flicts in the interstate setting. South Dakota, for example, opposed having a 
tribal marijuana resort within its borders because of fears that it might en-
tice non-Indian state residents to engage in conduct illegal under state 
law.126 Yet even as the Flandreau Santee Sioux Nation was forced to sus-
pend its marijuana resort plans, numerous “bud and breakfast” operations 
were opening in Colorado and Washington, potentially creating similar dif-
ficulties for neighboring states with differing marijuana policies.127 
Despite this basic similarity in the nature of the potential conflicts, 
however, the tribal context differs in the sheer unsettledness of the legal 
climate. Major questions remain about the extent of state authority to regu-
late state citizens’ purchase or use of marijuana in Indian country and about 
the power of tribes to regulate nonmember conduct. Further, states and 
tribes relate to each other in a climate often characterized by distrust and 
unfamiliarity, and in the absence of the mechanisms that facilitate better 
interstate relations. 
Although a more certain legal climate would benefit tribes in many ar-
eas of law, clearly mapping out tribal powers with respect to marijuana 
should be one of the most urgent priorities given the interest of many tribes 
in the issue, the controversy surrounding the area in general, and the com-
plexity of the federal, state, and tribal regulation that may potentially apply. 
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In some cases, tribes may be able to negotiate agreements individually with 
states or the federal government. But comprehensive legislation would 
avoid the potential conflict or delay attending such efforts. Congress has 
vast powers under the Indian Commerce Clause to make laws affecting both 
tribes and tribal-state relations, powers that likely include the ability to af-
firm and reinforce traditional aspects of tribal sovereignty.128 Given that 
Congress may already consider legislation to help resolve the marijuana 
issue more generally, it is important that tribes and their interests should be 
taken into account.129 
Imperfect as it is, the IGRA may be useful as a source of both positive 
and negative guidance. Marijuana legislation could benefit from some of the 
arguable successes of IGRA, such as creating a structured process for nego-
tiation, while avoiding some of its failures, including insufficient federal 
oversight of the compacting process and the unequal sovereign immunity re-
gime it establishes. Alex Tallchief Skibine has advocated for a revised version 
of IGRA reliant on what he calls a “cooperative tri-federalism: a version of 
federalism involving the tribes, the federal government, and the states.”130 
Skibine suggests suggest, for example, that the federal government could set 
forth generalized requirements for tribal gaming with input from tribes and 
states and then negotiate compacts with particular tribes.131 A similar mod-
el—that is, a structure under which federal law sets standards that leave indi-
vidual tribes and states room to negotiate—could also work in the marijuana 
context. Along related lines, Melinda Smith has offered a detailed proposal 
for what a federal framework might look like, including the establishment of 
a commission that would issue permits to all marijuana businesses condi-
tioned on prior consultation with affected tribal, state, and local govern-
ments.132 
Both proposals would improve upon IGRA by foregrounding the fed-
eral-tribal relationship, while still offering mechanisms for state input and 
devices for resolving state-tribal conflicts. In an area fraught with uncertain-
ty and unconstrained by constitutional principles, legislation could play an 
important role in allowing tribes to exercise their sovereignty in a manner 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Gover & Gede, supra note 5, at 186–87 (describing federal powers). 
 129 See Stephanie Akin, Congress Turning a New Leaf on Marijuana, ROLL CALL (Sept. 8, 
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 130 Skibine, supra note 22, at 282. 
 131 Id. at 288. 
 132 See Melinda Smith, Comment, Native Americans and the Legalization of Marijuana: Can 
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that does not unduly interfere with states’ ability to enforce their own laws 
outside of Indian country. 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing individual tribes the autonomy to develop their own mariju-
ana policies is a potential boon both for the Native community and for the 
nation as a whole. For tribes, marijuana represents both an economic oppor-
tunity and a chance to translate tribal values into policy. Meanwhile, state 
and local governments can benefit from the diverse experiences of tribes 
acting as Brandeisian laboratories of democracy. Yet the potential for tribes 
to forge their own paths in the area of marijuana is hindered by the prob-
lems inherent in maintaining smooth relationships with states while they do 
so. In an area where law is uncertain and mutual suspicion is often high, it 
may be necessary for the federal government to provide both protection for 
tribal sovereignty and mechanisms for resolving legitimate spillover con-
cerns that both states and tribes may have. The state, tribal, and federal ex-
perience with IGRA, as troubled as it has sometimes been, nonetheless pro-
vides useful lessons that should shape any federal involvement. 
